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Abstract: 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have emerged as an important application 
area resulting from the advancement of efficient short-range radio 
communication and miniaturization of computing devices .As these networks 
(WSNs) are built upon a shared medium that makes it easy for adversaries to 
conduct radio interference, or jamming, attacks that effectively cause a denial of 
service of either transmission or reception functionalities. In this paper we survey 
different jamming attacks that may be employed against a sensor network, as 
well as different types of defense strategies in order to cope with the problem of 
jamming attacks. 
A jamming attack can be launched in data-link layer or physical layer. Link layer 
jamming attacks disturb the communication between sensor nodes around the 
jammer. Physical layer jamming attacks let the radios frequency interfere with the 
open wireless environment. In WSN architecture, Base Stations (BSs) are the 
prime target for jamming attack because of their importance in aggregating 
sensor readings, and for playing a role in security protocols. Our objective is to 
find a defense strategy against BS jamming attack in WSNs. 
I 
Introduction: 
Wireless Sensor Network, or WSN, is a network of RF transceivers, sensors, 
machine controllers, microcontrollers, and user interface devices with at least two 
nodes communicating by means of wireless transmissions. The development of 
wireless sensor network (WSNs) was originally motivated by military applications 
such as battlefield monitoring [5]. However, wireless sensor networks are now 
used in many industrial and civilian application areas, including machine health 
monitoring, environment and habitat monitoring [2], indoor sensor networks with 
sensor enabled user interfaces [1], home automation, and traffic control. As the 
applications of WSNs are increasing, providing security and trustworthiness is an 
important issue. In WSN, sensor nodes have limited resources such as energy, 
computation power and storage available. The broadcast nature of 
communication in WSN significantly increases the capabilities of adversary to 
initiate Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In a DoS attack, an adversary can deny 
to follow medium access protocol. In this manner, it can continuously transmit on 
the wireless channel, and prevent the legitimate user to perform MAC operations, 
or introduce packet collision that force repeated back ofts, or even jam 
transmission [3]. 
Jamming attacks are representative energy consumption DoS attacks in WSN. 
Jamming is a well known DoS attack, which interferes with the radio frequencies 
used by sensor nodes for communication. Anti-jamming techniques such as 
spread-spectrum and lower duty cycle are not widely applicable for low cost 
sensor networks [4]. 
In a WSN, the Base Station (BS) aggregates sensor readings and conducts 
command and control tasks. So it is a central point of failure and is an attractive 
target for jamming attack, because failing of it can render the whole WSN out-of-
service during attack [6]. 
2 
Basic Sensor Network Operation: 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of spatially distributed autonomous 
sensors nodes to cooperatively monitor physical or environmental conditions, 
such as temperature, sound, vibration , pressure, motion or pollutants. Each node 
in a sensor network consists of a transceiver unit, a processing unit, a power unit, 
a small microcontroller and a battery which is used as the energy source. The 
transceiver unit connects the node to the network. Power unit (7) is an important 
component of a node and it may be supported by power generator such as solar 
cells. Sensor nodes are equipped with very limited computational power and 
energy resource. The WSN consists of hundreds or thousands of nodes that are 
scattered in an area called sensor field. The nodes sense data and forward the 
same to the outside world via the sink node or the base station. The base station 
or the sink node is responsible for receiving data from the nodes present in the 
network and processing them for sending data to the outside world . (8) 
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Figure 1: Basic Sensor Network Operation 
Figure .1 shows the operation of a sensor network [9]. The data ultimately 
reaches the user via the internet or satellite. Nodes in a WSN are deployed in an 
open field and thereby they remain unattended and are prone to attack [10] by 
adversaries. One of the attacks is jamming attack where the adversary blocks the 
radio communication of one or more nodes which are within the sensing range of 
the adversary by capturing a particular frequency. 
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Jamming Attacks: 
There are many different attack strategies an adversary can use to jam wireless 
communications [11]. Some commonly known attack strategies discuss bellow 
Constant jammer: 
The constant jammer continually emits a radio signal, and can be implemented 
using either a waveform generator that continuously sends a radio signal [12] or 
a normal wireless device that continuously sends out random bits to the channel 
without following any MAC-layer etiquette [13]. 
Deceptive jammer: 
Instead of sending out random bits, the deceptive jammer constantly injects 
regular packets to the Channel without any gap between subsequent packet 
transmissions. As a result, a normal communicator will be deceived into believing 
there is a legitimate packet and be duped to remain in the receive state. For 
example, in TinyOS, if a preamble is detected, a node remains in the receive 
mode, regardless of whether that node has a packet to send or not. Even if a 
node has packets to send, it cannot switch to the send state because a constant 
stream of incoming packets will be detected. 
Random jammer: 
Instead of continuously sending out a radio signal, a random jammer alternates 
between sleeping and jamming. Specifically, after jamming for a while, it turns off 
its radio and enters a "sleeping" mode. During its jamming phase, it can behave 
like either a constant jammer or a deceptive jammer. This jammer model tries to 
take energy conservation into consideration, which is especially important for 
those jammers that do not have unlimited power supply. 
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Reactive jammer: 
An alternative approach to jamming wireless communication is to employ a 
reactive strategy. The reactive jammer stays quiet when the channel is idle, but 
starts transmitting a radio signal as soon as it senses activity on the channel. 
One advantage of a reactive jammer is that it is harder to detect. 
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Figure 2: Jamming attacks target a sensor's ability to 
transmit or receive packets. Different jamming models 
accomplish the objective of blocking communications through 
different strategies. [O]XU et. al. 
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Different types of defense strategies: 
A number of works towards defending WSN from attacks have reported so far. 
Some of those are not that effective and some of those have advanced detection 
strategies. A brief description about some of these techniques is given bellow. 
Signal Strength: 
One natural measurement that can be employed to detect jamming is signal 
strength. The rationale behind using this measurement is that the signal strength 
[11] distribution may be affected by the presence of a jammer. Two natural 
approaches to detecting jamming using signal strength involve comparing 
average signal magnitude vs. a threshold calculated from the ambient noise 
levels, and classifying the shape of a window of signal samples. 
Packet Delivery Ratio: 
PDR may be used to detect the presence of jamming, as the jammer can 
effectively corrupt transmissions, leading to a much lower PDR. Since a jamming 
attack will degrade the channel quality surrounding a node, the detection of radio 
interference attack essentially boils down to determining whether the 
communication node can send or receive packets in the way it should have had 
the jammer not been present. More formally, let us consider the PDR between a 
sender and a receiver who are within radio range of each other, assuming that 
the network only contains these two nodes and that they are static. As noted 
earlier, an effective jammer results in a very poor PDR, close to 0, which 
indicates that PDR may be a good candidate in detecting jamming attacks. We 
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would like to point out that a non aggressive jammer, which only marginally 
affects the PDR, does not cause noticeable damage to network quality and does 
not need to be detected or defended against. 
Carrier Sensing Time: 
A jammer can prevent a legitimate source from sending out packets because the 
channel might appear constantly busy to the source, and hence it might seem 
possible to use carrier sensing time as a means to determine whether a device is 
jammed. In [) the authors explored this possibility. We observed that using carrier 
sensing time is suitable when the following two conditions are true: the jammer is 
non-reactive or non random, and the underlying MAC protocol determines 
whether a channel is idle by comparing the noise level with a fixed threshold. If 
these two conditions are true, carrier sensing time is an efficient way to 
discriminate a jammed scenario from a normal ill-functioning scenario, such as 
congestion, because the sensing time will be bounded , although large, in a 
congested situation, but unbounded in a jammed situation. Overall, carrier 
sensing time alone cannot be used to detect all the jamming scenarios. 
Our Recommended Solution: 
In this paper, we propose a hybrid model of defense for mitigating BS jamming 
attacks in WSNs. The hybrid model is a combination of three defense 
techniques: the first technique is mapping jammed area, so that Network services 
can use this knowledge to influence routing , power management, and higher-
layer planning. Our second technique BS replication , so in a jamming condition, 
there may be some unjammed replicated BSs, which can provide service to the 
network .. The second defense technique is multipath routing, so there may be 
some alternate paths available for communication with BS in case of jamming 
one or more paths by jammers. In this work, we enhance DYMO routing protocol 
[9] to support multiple path data delivery. 
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Problem Overview: 
A jamming attack can be launched in data-link layer or physical layer. Link layer 
jamming attacks disturb the communication between sensor nodes around the 
jammer. Physical layer jamming attacks let the radios frequency interfere with the 
open wireless environment. In WSN architecture, BSs are the prime target for 
jamming attack because of their importance in aggregating sensor readings, and 
for playing a role in security protocols. We propose a hybrid model of defense 
against BS jamming attack in WSNs. The hybrid model contains a combination of 
three defense techniques. A brief description about these techniques is given 
below 
Mapping Jammed Areas: 
Following the detection of whether a node is jammed, it is desirable for the 
network to map out regions of the sensor network that are jammed. By having a 
map of jammed areas, network services can use this knowledge to influence 
routing, power management, and higher-layer planning. A protocol for mapping 
out the jammed regions of a sensor network was presented in [] . In this article 
jamming detection is performed by monitoring channel utilization. Once the 
sensors observe that their channel utility is below a preset threshold , they 
conclude that they are jammed. Following detection, the jammed nodes bypass 
their MAC-layer temporarily and broadcast JAMMED messages, announcing the 
fact that they are jammed. These JAMMED messages will not be able to be 
received by other jammed neighbors. However, those neighbors on the boundary 
of the jammed region, but are not themselves jammed themselves, will be able to 
hear the JAMMED messages, though potentially at a higher error rate. Once 
non-jammed sensors receive JAMMED messages, they initiate the mapping 
procedure. These non jammed nodes exchange and merge information 
describing which nodes they have witnessed as jammed, where those jammed 
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sensors are located, along with neighbor information. By continuing the 
exchange of information regarding witnessed jammed nodes, the network will 
eventually be able to map out the boundary of a jammed area. We describe there 
idea bellow. 
How To Map Jammed Area: 
Two primary components form the basis of the mapping service, a jamming 
detection module, and a mapping module. Both operate on every node in the 
network. The jamming detection module is responsible for monitoring the radio 
and medium access control (MAC) layers and applying heuristics to determine 
whether the node is jammed. When it determines that the local node is most 
likely jammed, it sends a message to its neighbors by overriding the carrier-
sense multiple access (CSMA) limitation usually enforced by the MAC, shown in 
Figure 3(a).it alerts the application layer, which can apply power management 
strategies to help the node outlast the jamming. 
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Figure 3(a) 
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Mapping is initiated by the neighbors of jammed nodes who receive the jamming 
notifications. Each receiver forms a group, explicitly adding nearby jammed 
nodes as jammed members; the receiver itself becomes a mapping member. 
Figure 3(b) shows mapping messages, which contain information about the local 
group, being exchanged between neighbors . 
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Neighboring groups are coalesced and eventually most or all of the mapping 
members know about the jammed region, as shown in Figure 3(c). Details of the 
mapping protocol are in Section 2.2. When the jammer(s) move or simply stop 
the attack, the jammed nodes recover and send notifications to their neighbors 
informing them of this change. The mapping members change the status of the 
formerly jammed nodes and send messages to update the group. When a 
mapping member knows of no neighboring nodes that remain jammed, it retires 
from the group. 
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Figure 3(c): 
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BS Replication: 
According to this technique, there should be multiple replicated BS in WSN, so 
that in case of a jamming attack, if one or more BSs are not jammed, these can 
serve the whole WSN, and the WSN can continue delivering data for alonger 
time during such a jamming attack. When jammed BS becomes unjamed, they 
may request for the sensor readings from unjammed BSs. 
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Figure 4: as Replication 
Multipath Routing: 
Our third defense technique is multipath routing. According to this technique, 
there should be multiple paths between sensor nodes and BS, so that in case of 
jamming attack, if atleast one path between sensor node and BS is not jammed, 
the BS can get sensor readings through this path and the sensor network can 
continue working. Through multipath routing , traffic dispersion can be used to 
prevent eavesdropping, to do load balancing or to minimize the energy 
consumption by nodes. Traffic dispersion means that, for a same source 
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destination pair, communication simultaneously uses different paths (i.e. multiple 
paths) instead of a single one U. 
Figure 3 shows a WSN consisting of 5 BSs and 3 mobile jammers, one of which 
successfully jams a BS. There are two paths from sensor node S1 to BS B1 
(path P1 and path P2). As one sensor node under path P2 is jammed, sensor 
readings are delivered by path P1. Thus there is no effect of jamming on un-
jammed BSs for reading the sensor information from un-jammed sensor nodes. 
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Figure 5: Multipath Routing 
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Network Framework and Attack Model: 
Our WSN is organized in a tree-like structure, where BS works as a root node of 
the tree. Sensor nodes sense around, and report the sensing result to the BS. 
Sensing results contain the normal sensing data or alarm event messages. The 
sensor nodes under the jammed area are called jammed sensor nodes. These 
jammed sensor nodes cannot transmit data to the BS. According to a pro-active 
defense strategy, the BS roam among collection points using a pseudo-random 
schedule, pre-loaded off-line. It may be possible that the unjammed BS have to 
change location, while jammed BS may remain at their location. Multipath 
extension of DYMO routing protocol proposed in [15] introduces the advertised 
hop count to prevent loops and a header extension (the last hop field) to identify 
the path. Last hop is the destination neighbour. The path is identified with the pair 
nexthop/last-hop. 
The following are the modifications made by [15] in DYMO routing protocol for 
extending it to a multipath routing protocol: 
1. During the request phase, every intermediate node has to save the path to the 
request the packet's originator in order to send the corresponding reply message 
to it. Therefore, every intermediate node registers all the paths with different last 
hops though they may arrive through the same neighbour (next hop in the 
path register) . 
2. During the reply phase, when the destination node receives a Route Request, 
it sends the reply back through the neighbour node from which it received the 
packet; the last-hop value is the same one contained in the request packet. The 
first path used by each intermediate node with this last hop is the valid path and 
determines its next hop; the node removes the other paths with the same next 
hop although with a different last hop. 
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3. After the route discovery process, every node will have one or more routes for 
every possible destination. 
Simulation results of [15] show that by introducing multipath routing, reduction in 
the throughput of both UDP and TCP connections is under 20%. It shows that 
multipath extension of the routing protocol decreases the throughput only by a 
little amount. 
Limitation of Our Model: 
We assume the following capabilities of jamming attackers: 
1. An attacker can compromise a sensor node, and can obtain all its information. 
2. Jammers can move, so that jammed locations can be changed by the mobile 
jammers. 
3. The mobile jammers are uncoordinated and unsynchronized. They follow an 
off-line schedule to determine when, where, and which jammers to move. So it 
may happen that successfully jamming attackers have to move, while 
unsuccessful ones remain still. 
4. Jammers continuously emit RF signals to fill the wireless channel, so that 
legitimate traffic may be blocked. A jammer can do this by either preventing 
sensor nodes to send sensor readings, or by preventing the reception of 
legitimate traffic at the BSs. 
5. A jammer does not have information about the whole network, and it cannot 
jam the entire network. 
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6. Jammers can flood the BS with illegitimate packets, so that it cannot receive 
legitimate packets from sensor nodes 
7. We assume that the attacker cannot be 
DYMO Multipath Routing Protocol: 
Our multipath routing protocol is an extension of DYMO (Dynamic MANET On-
demand) routing protocol, which is based on []. DYMO [] is basically an 
enhancement of the AODV protocol (3). In the multipath route discovery process, 
if several Route Replies arrive at the source, through different neighbor nodes 
and different path identifiers, the DYMO agent keeps these nodes as next hops 
in the destination entry of its route table, which enables extending the path 
selection algorithm to make traffic dispersion. For traffic dispersion, multiple 
paths between source-destination pair will be link disjoint routes, so that nodes 
can be common for two or more paths. 
Conclusion and Future plan: 
In this paper, we propose a hybrid model of defense for mitigating BS jamming 
attacks in WSNs. The hybrid model is a combination of three defense 
techniques: the first technique is BS replication, so in a jamming condition, there 
may be some unjammed replicated BSs,ln wireless sensor networks the nodes 
are subjected to various types of attacks including jamming attack. 
In our next semester we will show the result by simulation analysis. In order to 
simulate the proposed techniques, we used a discrete 
event simulator named QualNet (14), 
17 
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